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14. ABSTRACT To be effective in defeating radical extremist ideology we must understand the conditions that allow it to exist thereby understanding the nature of the conflict. Transnational terrorist organizations take advantage of the seams between governed and ungoverned, between the haves and the have-nots, and in areas where there is no perceived alternative to violence to ensure survival. Therefore it can be argued that local instability provides a venue for transnational terrorist organizations to foment their radical ideology providing at the very least tacit support for their violence. This paper argues that forward deploying SOF to work in close coordination with host nation partners will facilitate United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) ability to synchronize WOT objectives while providing the GCC and US Country Team with SOF expertise to meet local and regional challenges. This paper will further argue that while SOF alone cannot meet all of the foreign internal defense (FID), COIN, or advisory needs of the host nation, it is the force of choice to bridge the gap between host nation force requirements, general purpose force or interagency capabilities and U.S. Country Team, GCC, and USSOCOM Long War objectives. This paper will examine the politically sensitive operational environment using a contemporary case study as an example. Secondly, it will discuss the counter argument and disadvantages of developing an "Advisory Corps" and other general purpose force initiatives. Third, it will describe the attributes that make SOF the force of choice to serve as the bridge between host nation requirements, country team objectives, and general purpose force training capabilities. Finally, it will provide a framework to operationalize the USSOCOM "Presence for Purpose" concept to synchronize National and Regional WOT objectives while providing SOF expertise and support to the GCC and US Country Teams.				
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**“Presence for Purpose” Forward Deploying to Capitalize on SOF Capability and
Regional Expertise**

by

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Major, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

23 April 2008

Abstract

To be effective in defeating radical extremist ideology we must understand the conditions that allow it to exist thereby understanding the nature of the conflict. Transnational terrorist organizations take advantage of the seams between governed and ungoverned, between the haves and the have-nots, and in areas where there is no perceived alternative to violence to ensure survival. Therefore it can be argued that local instability provides a venue for transnational terrorist organizations to foment their radical ideology providing at the very least tacit support for their violence.

This paper argues that forward deploying SOF to work in close coordination with host nation partners will facilitate United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) ability to synchronize WOT objectives while providing the GCC and US Country Team with SOF expertise to meet local and regional challenges. This paper will further argue that while SOF alone cannot meet all of the foreign internal defense (FID), COIN, or advisory needs of the host nation, it is the force of choice to bridge the gap between host nation force requirements, general purpose force or interagency capabilities and U.S. Country Team, GCC, and USSOCOM Long War objectives.

This paper will examine the politically sensitive operational environment using a contemporary case study as an example. Secondly, it will discuss the counter argument and disadvantages of developing an “Advisory Corps” and other general purpose force initiatives. Third, it will describe the attributes that make SOF the force of choice to serve as the bridge between host nation requirements, country team objectives, and general purpose force training capabilities. Finally, it will provide a framework to operationalize the USSOCOM “Presence for Purpose” concept to synchronize National and Regional WOT objectives while providing SOF expertise and support to the GCC and US Country Teams.

Introduction

The National Defense Strategy directs the Department of Defense to execute an “active layered defense” to combat terrorism well forward of our borders. The key to winning this “War on Terror” (WOT) is targeting the local instability in our partner nations that provides the venue for transnational terrorism and its radical ideology.

Thesis

This paper argues that forward deploying Special Operations Forces (SOF) to work in close coordination with host nation partners will best facilitate United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) ability to synchronize WOT objectives while providing the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) and U.S. Country Team with SOF expertise to meet local and regional challenges. This paper will further argue that while SOF alone cannot meet all of the foreign internal defense (FID), Counterinsurgency (COIN), or advisory needs of the host nation, it is the force of choice to serve as the “catalyst to unify, extend the reach, and maximize the effects of other military assets and other instruments of military (and national) power”ⁱ in support of U.S. Country Team and GCC objectives.

Additionally, persistent forward presence of SOF in support of United States Country Teams and theater security activities “provides access to information and intelligence critical to anticipating and understanding new threats.”ⁱⁱ The daily interaction of SOF operators with their host nation counterparts at the tactical and operational level allows for a deeper cultural understanding of the operational environment that cannot be obtained through other intelligence activities or through the temporary presence of a general purpose force battalion participating in “mass produced advisory”.

The Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) already has forces with regional expertise, cultural understanding, and the ability to build and maintain rapport with partner nations.ⁱⁱⁱ This allows “the United States to project power (by with, and through partner nations) against threats and support the establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions that foster extremist ideologies.”^{iv}

The challenge is not how to reapportion our conventional units to an advisory role. The challenge is to properly employ forward deployed SOF as a combat multiplier to increase host nation capacity, provide accurate timely intelligence, and to facilitate GCC employment of conventional capability by identifying requirements.

Methodology

This paper will examine the politically sensitive operational environment using a contemporary case study as an example. Secondly, it will discuss the counter argument and disadvantages of developing an “Advisory Corps” and other general purpose force initiatives. Third, it will describe the attributes that make SOF the force of choice to serve as the bridge between host nation requirements, country team objectives, and general purpose force training capabilities. Finally, it will provide a framework to operationalize the USSOCOM “Presence for Purpose” concept to synchronize National and Regional WOT objectives while providing SOF expertise and support to the GCC and US Country Teams.

The “War on Terror” a Global Counterinsurgency

To be effective in defeating radical extremist ideology we must understand the conditions that allow it to exist thereby understanding the nature of the conflict.

Transnational terrorist organizations take advantage of the seams between governed and

ungoverned, between the haves and the have-nots, and in areas where there is no perceived alternative to violence to ensure survival. Therefore it can be argued that local instability provides a venue for transnational terrorist organizations to foment their radical ideology providing at the very least tacit support for their violence.

“Political, religious, and ethnic extremism coupled with the absence of effective governance provide sanctuary for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents”^v directly challenging the ability of our partner nations to maintain local and regional stability. A contemporary example of this concept is found in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Southern Philippines.

The ARMM is governed by former tribal based Muslim militant groups that have a negotiated peace settlement with the Philippine Government. Poverty, lack of governmental services, and limited access to Philippine Security Forces (PSF) has provided an operational area for local radical splinter groups like the Abu Sayyaf to provide safe haven for regional and transnational terrorists.^{vi}

It is important to understand the significance of the relationship between these various organizations. The existence of a local surrogate insurgent group, a disenfranchised population, and limited access to government security forces produced local instability that linked local and regional terrorist organizations with Al Qaeda, a transnational group.

Case Study

Indirect Approach

“If we accept that the War on Terror is counterinsurgency on a global scale then we should also accept that the correct way to contribute to the defeat and deterrence of terrorism is to enable friends, allies, and partners with sufficient capacity to defend their countries.”^{vii}

This concept supports the National Defense Strategy guidance to “focus military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward, and layered defense of our nation,” by increasing the capacity of partner nations to “meet challenges to our common interests.”^{viii}

The “indirect approach” targets the underlying causes of insurgency and instability that allow radical ideology to flourish.^{ix} It provides a careful balance between security, responsible governance, and development. Additionally, it provides for the needs of the population and offers alternatives to violence.

The indirect approach is executed by, with, and through our host nation partner. It is their effort, with the United States Country Team in a supporting role, synchronizing all elements of national power to assist combating the conditions that allow for the common threat. Key to this effort is supporting the legitimacy of our partner nation to deal with instability within its sovereign territory. This is extremely politically sensitive requiring the United States to maintain a small foot print and remain in the background. Additionally, it requires a persistent presence of quiet military professionals, in support of the country team and GCC, that are “culturally attuned, proficient in foreign languages, and who physically blend into the operational environment.”^x This is the environment that SOF is manned, trained, and equipped for.

Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines¹

United States efforts to assist the Republic of the Philippines in ridding lawless insurgent groups that harbor regional and at times transnational terrorists is a sterling

¹ The author served as JSOTF-P Director of Operations (J3) from March 2006 – May 2007. Additionally he served as an advisor to Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Special Operations Group on three rotations from 2003 - 2005

example of by, with, and through support to a partner nation conducting COIN.² JSOTF-P is truly an economy of force SOF operation averaging between 150 – 500 personnel assigned between 2002 and 2008. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) is successful because it maintains a small SOF footprint in a politically sensitive environment where perceptions of basing or permanent U.S. Military presence are against the country's constitution. More importantly, the operation is completely synchronized between the JSOTF-P Headquarters, U.S. Country Team, TSOC, and the GCC. This mutual effort enables JSOTF-P to assist our partner nation along four lines of operations that are balanced and executed simultaneously.

First, JSOTF-P assists Philippine Security Forces (PSF), which includes military and law enforcement, by increasing their capacity to provide security and conduct COIN operations. This is conducted by Special Forces and Navy SEAL detachments working closely with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units in the field. SOF advisors can be found at all levels of command from battalion level to Western and Eastern Mindanao Commands which are Regional Unified Commands equivalent to a United States corps level headquarters. Additionally, JSOTF-P staff members in close coordination with the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG), interact with Philippine National level headquarters to facilitate our support to their efforts.

Second, JSOTF-P conducts civil military operations (CMO) to remove the conditions that allow insurgent groups to exist and foment their radical ideology. These efforts begin

² Background information on Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines and JSOTF-P can be found at: David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, "Winning In The Pacific: The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 44, 1st Quarter 2007 and B.A. Patty, "To Raise Them Up, Part 1 (The Lesser and Greater Insurgencies of the Philippines), Part 2 (The Role of the Philippines in the Long War), Part 3 (Investing in People)" The Long War Journal Online, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/to_raise_them_up_par_1.php

with SOF detachments and their AFP counterparts conducting local assessments of the operational environment and working closely with local governmental units to identify development requirements, which can range from medical support or livelihood training, to building schools and roads. The key to these programs is interagency coordination, there are numerous governmental, international, and non-governmental agencies that have enormous capability and that want to provide assistance. SOF Civil Affairs detachments, working side by side with USAID from the country team, synchronize all of these agencies efforts to ensure that the right support gets to the right place to assist the population and more importantly remove conditions that allow for lawless activities.

Third, JSOTF-P provides intelligence support to the AFP to define the operational environment and assist in the execution of combat and force protection operations. Again this is done through SOF detachments on the ground with their AFP counterparts. Intelligence requirements are identified and the JSOTF provides intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. This support is also closely coordinated with the country team to maximize the capabilities of interagency partners.

Fourth, JSOTF-P conducts Information Operations (IO). JSOTF-P Military Information Support Teams work closely with AFP public affairs and the country team Public Affairs Section to enhance the legitimacy of Philippine government to provide services for the population, provide good governance and human rights, and provide security. All SOF personnel are part of this effort by working closely with their counterparts to present a disciplined, responsive military that supports the government and the local population.

JSOTF-P works closely with the MAAG, TSOC, country team, and GCC to set conditions for the employment of general purpose forces, additional SOF, and interagency

partners to allow for a temporary increase in capacity and to introduce additional capability to support Philippine efforts. This effort has been extremely successful and offers a model to use traditional Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) events to achieve shaping and deterrence effects preventing instability and restricting insurgency at the local level where it can be defeated.

Forward deployed SOF assists in targeting these events by identifying the requirement, conducting IO prior to the event to “put the partner nation forward,” and facilitating general purpose force or other agency employment by using pre-established long term relationships in the operational environment. Balikatan, USNS MERCY, employment of a MARSOC in combat FID, and SOCPAC Joint Combined Exercise Training events are all tools that Pacific Command has used to achieve effects in support of JSOTF-P, the challenge has been breaking the tradition of these being purely training exercises and conducting the events in areas designated as combat zones.³

Balikatan is a Tagalog (Filipino) word meaning “shoulder to shoulder” describing an annual bilateral United States, Philippine exercise to foster military relations, interoperability, and to provide CMO events to areas in need. Traditionally the exercise was conducted on Luzon the northern island group. Starting in 2001 Pacific Command began using the CMO events from the exercise to achieve effects for JSOTF-P and their AFP counterparts. The event has provided an annual temporary surge of capability and resources to improve medical, educational, and economic conditions in areas where insurgents once enjoyed pure autonomy and terrorized the local population.

³ Traditional TSCP events were used primarily as Mil to Mil training and support venues usually executed in a portion of the country that had little or no impact on WOT objectives. TSCP has more recently been used to achieve shaping and deterrence effects to maximize GCC limited resources against regional WOT objectives.

The 2006 USNS MERCY visit to the Southern Philippines provides an example of forward deployed SOF ability to facilitate the employment of general purpose forces. USNS MERCY advance party planners attempted to coordinate with the AFP and local medical clinics without fully coordinating activities with JSOTF-P. This caused numerous challenges during the planning process, the MERCY planners failed to realize they would be operating in a combat zone which restricted their mobility and increased their requirements for force protection.

The planners failed to understand the operational environment and planned for activities in some areas that already had medical care and in others where they would indirectly legitimize corrupt officials. Additionally, MERCY planners initially did not synchronize their public affairs with the country team IO themes. The USNS MERCY wanted to show the good that the United States and the international volunteers they had on board were going to provide. The more important message was that this was an opportunity to provide medical capability and care in support of Philippine efforts that were ongoing every day, “putting our partner nation forward.”

JSOTF-P conducted planning to maximize the capabilities of the USNS MERCY and with the assistance of two Special Forces surgeons and a new USNS MERCY planner, the Civil Affairs Detachment and their AFP counterparts were able to fix the plan achieving enormous dividends for the population, the Philippine government, AFP, and the United States while simultaneously removing some conditions that allowed the insurgency to exist.

“Advisory Corps” and Other GPF Initiatives

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused the United States to reassess the disposition and activities of our military forces. Do we maintain our ability to confront two

near simultaneous major theaters of war or do we accept risk in the conventional fight by reapportioning some of our conventional combat formations to serve as an “Advisory Corps?”^{xi} Some military officers and academics argue we should refocus a sizeable portion of our conventional forces to an advisory role, “Under this logic, U.S. forces would be configured for deterring and prevailing in one significant conflict while conducting a large-scale, steady-state effort against terrorist groups in multiple regions.”^{xii}

They agree with the tenants of this paper’s argument that enabling partner nations during the shaping and deterrence phases will prevent local challenges from spreading into regional instability thereby limiting the spread of radical ideology and transnational terrorist safe haven. However, they offer the approach of mass produced, short term advisory. LTC (RET) John Nagl “calls for developing a 20,000 strong advisor corps, complete with its own doctrine and commander.”^{xiii} This would require the Army and Marines to shift up to one third of their tactical combat brigades to an “advisory assistance” role.^{xiv}

There are several problems with this approach. First, as LTC Nagl pointed out in his article:

“The Army and Marine Corps are exhausted and desperately need time and money to rebuild. That’s not likely; keeping up the security the United States purchased at such a high price in Iraq last year will require committing tens of thousands of U.S. ground forces for several more years at least -- and maintaining a significant presence in Iraq for a decade or more.”^{xv}

That being the case, how can we develop a strategy that removes up to one third of the forces required to support operations in Iraq for operations in other regions?

Second, conventional forces consider “long term” in terms of months rather than a more persistent presence. Both the Army and Marine concepts for “Advisory” efforts follow a traditional mobile training team construct. “Mobile training teams (MTTs) from the general-purpose forces visit host countries episodically for combined training exercises and

in smaller numbers to provide specialized training not inherent in the MAAGs.”^{xvi} Advisory roles to support Long War objectives require a “long-term effort on the ground, face to face with our allies.” “To be effective, they (advisors) should be stationed in the country for as long a period as practical – a year is minimum” longer is better.^{xvii}

Finally, FID and COIN by, with, and through partner nations is politically sensitive requiring years of experience, regional expertise, foreign language skills, and the ethos of a “warrior diplomat”. General purpose forces have an important role in these efforts; they provide the subject matter expertise in more technical areas and possess capacity to train larger formations. However, the size of the conventional force footprint should only be a temporary one to meet requirements of the country team as recommended by the MAAG and SOF advisors.

Why is SOF a Better Option?

SOF personnel are specifically selected and trained to operate at great distances from their operational bases for long periods of time. They possess a keen awareness of the socio-political environment they are operating in and understand the political implications of their actions.^{xviii} This “Warrior-Diplomat” mentality allows SOF to blend into their operational environment; they are as equally comfortable in the jungle with the troops as they are briefing senior officials from the host nation or U.S. Country Team. SOF personnel train extensively in building relationships, cross-culture communications, and fostering interagency cooperation.^{xix} These skills are the “defining characteristic of the indirect approach” and are critical to “gain access, build relationships, foster influence, and legitimize our partners by being true partners.”^{xx}

COIN, FID, and Unconventional Warfare (UW) are SOF core tasks providing a “career long experience in advisor operations.”^{xxi} SOF provides fifty plus years of Irregular Warfare (IW) experience.^{xxii} This allows SOF personnel to provide quality assessments of the operational environment and to identify requirements for general purpose force or interagency capabilities while simultaneously working with host nation partners to increase capacity and defeat local insurgents.

SOF is an economy of force presence requiring only a small footprint and limited resources to yield tactical and operational success. They bridge the gap between host nation force requirements, general purpose force or interagency capabilities and U.S. Country Team, GCC, and USSOCOM Long War objectives. SOF provides the persistent presence in the operational environment to maintain interoperability with host nation forces, provide accurate information, and the ability to rapidly respond to emerging crises.

Operationalizing SOF “Presence for Purpose”

Country Team

“The action arm of U.S. policy in the world is the U.S. Country Team headed by the ambassador.”^{xxiii} The country team wields all elements of U.S. national power and more importantly has established relationships with the host nation government to assist them in employing the host nation’s national power. This relationship is the foundation for any by, with, and through support to FID and COIN. The ambassador receives national guidance in regards to U.S. strategic objectives within their assigned country and solely possesses the authority and responsibility for any U.S. activities within that country. Therefore, critical to any relationships with host nation partners is the ability for the GCC to synchronize his objectives with that of the country teams within his respective area of operations. Beyond

liaison and coordination meetings most country teams have a military element to represent the GCC to foster military relationships and provide military advice to the country team. In some countries military presence may be as small as a few attaches or liaisons, however, in larger country teams or where the United States has increased interest and the political situation allows for it, a Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) is posted.

MAAG

The MAAG as originally designed was a “powerful instrument of military power.”^{xxiv} They provided military aid, training, advice, and assistance to our partner nations to prevent the spread of communist insurgencies. Over time, the MAAG has lost a significant number of resources and authorities relegating it to primarily focusing on the processing of foreign military sales, individual military education and training programs, coordinating theater security cooperation program exercises (TSCP) and to a very limited extent managing security assistance mobile training teams (MTT). Additionally, MAAGs are not always properly manned, replacing post-command tactical and operational level officers that have extensive operational and advisory experience with career Foreign Area Officers (FAO) who specialize in security assistance bureaucracy and embassy protocol. COL David Maxwell, a career Special Forces officer, offers a restructuring and renewed emphasis on the MAAG that will significantly improve the synchronization of U.S. military power at the country team level.

*“Given today’s conditions it might be useful to revive the Military Assistance **and Advisory** Group (MAAG), properly resource it and provide it with the correct authorities to employ it as the focal point for Security Force Assistance operations and to accomplish the following tasks:*

- *Conduct assessments of HN military forces and recommend capacity building support*
- *Provide C2 of US Advisors and Military units supporting capacity building*

- *Coordinate for the deployment, redeployment, and logistical support of US forces*
- *Provide liaison at appropriate HN military organizations*
- *Provide the conduit for sharing intelligence with the HN security forces*
- *Establish and sustain the long term relationships with HN military personnel that are key to successful employment of US support”^{xxv}*

Regardless of the structure, the MAAG or Defense Attaché Office in the absence of a MAAG, is the senior U.S. Military representative to the ambassador and needs to be the focal point for all military interaction within the country unless a Joint Operational Area Commander is designated for a specific operation. This will ensure military support to the country team and host nation supports U.S. policy and GCC theater objectives.

TSOC

The TSOC is the Special Operations component headquarters to the GCC. They possess personnel with significant regional and SOF experience to advise the GCC on the employment of SOF, synchronize USSOCOM and GCC WOT objectives, and maintain operational control over all assigned and deployed SOF in the theater. Additionally, the TSOC coordinates the regional WOT activities in support of the GCC and can serve as a deployable Joint Task Force. The TSOC will deploy assigned SOF and request additional SOF from USSOCOM as required to meet theater requirements, managing rotations to ensure persistence presence in support of Long War objectives.

Forward Deployed SOF

SOF Advance Operating Base (AOB) or Task Unit (TU) deploy as the command and control element for SOF advisor detachments. The AOB can operate at the tactical or operational level in the advisory role. The commander will answer to the MAAG to ensure operations are synchronized with country team and GCC objectives. The AOB will provide subordinate detachment assessments of the operational environment and recommend courses

of action to support the AOB commander's host nation counterpart. This organization is generally less than 120 personnel including the subordinate detachments and can deploy for up to 18 months rotating six subordinate detachments for tours of nine months each, in groups of three. For larger requirements a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) can be deployed which usually consists of 2 – 4 AOBs and up to 24 subordinate detachments. A regionally oriented Group can sustain persistence presence with its organic AOBs for 12 years and with the larger SOTF for 6 years.

SOF detachments are tactical level advisors. They live with our partner nation forces and are immersed in their operational planning, training, and culture giving them a true sense of the operational environment and a complete understanding of the conditions that allow insurgent groups to exist. They work with the local community and local governmental unit to identify requirements, develop a clearer picture of the socio-economic conditions, and to assist security forces in increasing their legitimacy with the local population. In COIN and FID environments the population is most always the center of gravity. Providing the balance of security and development for the local population will deny or deter insurgent and lawless activity while providing alternatives to violence and good governance to the population. This can best be accomplished with a small U.S. military footprint working by, with, and through our partner nation preventing local challenges from becoming regional or transnational terrorist Safe havens.

SOF cannot accomplish this alone, they advise and assist, conduct detailed operational assessments, provide persistence presence, and identify gaps that can be filled by using the technical or numerical capacity of general purpose forces conducting TSCP or MTTs or requirements that can be provided by other U.S. interagency partners and non-

governmental organizations. A perfect example of the effectiveness of SOF forward presence as an economy of force is an examination of Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines (JSOTF-P) support to the Republic of the Philippines.

Conclusion

The key to extending our operational reach in an “active layered defense” is enabling partner nations to meet local challenges preventing the conditions that allow for insurgent or lawless activity, regional instability, and transnational terrorist safe haven. The enemy in this War on Terror, as former JSOTF-P Commander COL James Linder eloquently puts it, is an idea; an idea of subjugation, violence, and hatred that attempts to undermine the peace and freedom that we are all entitled to. To defeat this enemy the United States must support our partner nations by increasing their legitimacy in the eyes of the population by providing the delicate balance of security, development, and good governance. This requires an synchronized effort led by the U.S. Country Team and supported by the GCC in which forward deployed, culturally attuned SOF serve as warrior diplomats shoulder to shoulder with their host nation counterparts. Our military footprint, IO themes, and activities should show the United States in a supporting role to our partner nations; this is their part of the greater War on Terror. The U.S. Country Team, MAAG, and forward deployed SOF serve at the frontier’s edge to support that effort.

Notes

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ⁱⁱⁱ Admiral Eric T. Olson, "Posture of Special Operations Forces," p. 6

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^v US Department of Defense, "The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America," Washington, DC: DoD, March 2005, p. 3

^{vi} Glenda M. Gloria, "Bearer of the Sword The Abu Sayyaf has nebulous beginnings and incoherent Aims," Southeast Asia Press Alliance, <http://www.seapabkk.org/news/philippines/8072000.html>

^{vii} David S. Maxwell, "Considerations for Organizing and Preparing for Security Force Assistance Operations," Draft Working Papers (ver 4), March 2008, p. 3

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^{ix} United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Posture Statement 2007, available at http://www.socom.mil/Docs/USSOCOM_Posture_Statement_2007.pdf

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^{xiv} Andrew Hoehn and David Ochmanek, Rand Corporation, "Real roles, missions debate"

^{xv} John A. Nagl, "We Can't Win These Wars On Our Own"

^{xvi} COL Robert J. Killebrew (RET), "SecDef Has Signaled a Turning Point in U.S. Defense Thinking"

^{xvii} Ibid

^{xviii} LTC John Mulberry, "ARSOE, General Purpose Forces and FID", Special Warfare Magazine, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School and Center, Jan 2008, p. 18

^{xix} Admiral Eric T. Olson, "Posture of Special Operations Forces," p. 3

^{xx} COL Joseph E. Osborne, Director, Irregular Warfare Directorate, USSOCOM, "Before a Joint Hearing of the House Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities on Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations," Feb 26, 2008, p. 7

^{xxi} David S. Maxwell, "Considerations for Organizing and Preparing for Security Force Assistance Operations," p. 1

^{xxii} COL Joseph E. Osborne, "Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations," p. 2

^{xxiii} COL Robert J. Killebrew (RET), "SecDef Has Signaled a Turning Point in U.S. Defense Thinking," <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/02/3240799>

^{xxiv} Ibid

^{xxv} David S. Maxwell, “Considerations for Organizing and Preparing for Security Force Assistance Operations,” p. 9

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